onsdag 21. april 2010

Mer akademisk desinformasjon


I eit essay i Ny Tid, 19. mars skriv Andres O. Lid og Jemima García-Godos at i motsetnad til Alberto Fujimori i Peru og Manuel Zelaya i Honduras, valde Colombia sin president Alvaro Uribe å føye seg etter grunnlovsdomstolen, når den sa nei til eit andre attval forUribe. Og at dette er ein demokratisk siger for heile Latin-Amerika. Det er ikkje måte på korleis O. Lid og García-Godos hyller Uribe som demokratiet sin redningsmann og den sterke mann som folk vil ha meir av i Colombia. Dei kritiserar også norsk media for å skrive negativtom presisdenten sitt sikkerheitspolitiske resultat.

Det er tvilsomt når folk frå Norsk senter for menneskerettar, som det heiter, ved det Juridiske Fakultet, Universitetet i Oslo, populærerklerar ein president med mafialiknande fortid og vener. Hans forhold til dei paramiltiære gruppene er velkjent, og mange av deinæraste medarbeidarane og nokre ministrar er dømde for korrupsjon og narkotikahandel. Colombia har dei fleste interne flyktningane i verda, meir enn fire millionar menneske. Dei har stadig paramilitære grupper aktive, ikkje alle er rehabiliterte, og Uribe var den president som konsekvent har nekta forhandlingar med geriljaen FARC.

Sju colombianske militærbasar har USA fått bruksrett til etter avtale i fjor, og stadig vert menneskerettsaktivistar, studentar og fagrørsleleiarar drept. Litt av ein bragd dette, av ein "demokratiskpresident". Ettermælet til Uribe vert vel ikkje betre om han så "heroisk" sa nei til vidare makt? At Fujimori var ein ukonstitusjonell president i Peru er rett og heva over tvil. Han utførte eit "sjølvkupp" i 1992 og oppløyste kongressen og kalla inn til ny grunnlovsforsamling. I den nye grunnlova kunne han stille til attval, og han vann. Den tredje gong Fujimori prøve seg i 2000 gjekk det ikkje, han vart kasta etter nokre månader. Å samanlikne dette med Manuel Zelaya i Honduras er absurd. Han gjorde ikkje sjølvkupp og han kalla ikkje inn til grunnlovsforsamling. Det artikkelskrivarane ikkje skriv er at president Zelaya vart styrta i eit militærkupp. Det eksisterte ikkje noko grunnlovsbrot! Heile greia vart dikta opp av kuppmakarane i eit forfalska avskjedsbrev. Dette somet påskot til å kvitte seg med ein president som hadde innført ein fordelingspolitikk som trua deira økonomiske interesser. Den ikkje-bindande folkelege konsultasjonen, som var utgangspunktet forkuppmakarane sin aksjon, var ikkje grunnlovstridig. Zelaya hadde heller ikkje nokon intensjon eller moglegheit til å forlenge sin presidentperiode eller stille til attval. Dette skulle vera velkjent for folk som kjenner Latin-Amerika og arbeidar med det på eit universitet. Det undrar meg også at skrivarane ser ut til å på prinsippielt grunnlag mislike at statsleiarar i det heile teke kan stille i meir enn ein periode. Er kontinuitet eit brot på folket sin vilje?

Ivar Jørdre, medlem av Latin-Amerika Gruppa i Bergen

What is so special about Venezuela?



What is so special about Venezuela?
Media outlets from around the world have been reporting about the threats posed by Hugo Chavez to journalists and freedom of speech in Venezuela. Among other things, these reports have resulted from the arrest of the owner of Globovisión, a Venezuelan TV-news network.

The arrest of Guillermo Zuloaga was ordered by the Venezuelan Attorney General Luisa Ortega, after Zuloaga made the following public statements to the Inter-American Press Association, in relation to the failed coup attempt against President Hugo Chávez, in April 2002:
“There was a demonstration without precedents against the president. There were around one million people in this demonstration. The president ordered to shoot at them, to ‘throw lead’ at them. That night, he terminated the General in Chief. It was the first time there was a General in Chief in 50 years, named by President Chávez. This General declared publicly that they had asked President Chávez to resign, to which he accepted... There were a series of circumstances that enabled him to return to power, and that is another story... We... are also against what was done at that time, because if they had done it right, we would probably have a different Venezuela today”.

What really happened on April 11th 2002This statement contrasts sharply with the April 2009 verdict of the judge of the 4th Court of Aragua and three aldermen, a verdict which was ratified by the Court of Appeals of Aragua in April 2010. The verdict was based on 230 audiences, 265 expert testimonies, around 5,700 photos, 20 videos and 198 witnesses. It concerned the accusation of three commissaries, six officials and one employee, all members of the Caracas Metropolitan Police. They were all thought to have been involved in the murders of 2 demonstrators, and the attempted homicide and injury of other demonstrators, during the events of April 11th 2002. These murders were a part of the plot that led to the coup attempt against President Chávez. The three commissaries and three of the officials were convicted and are to serve 30 years in prison. Meanwhile, two of the officials in trial were sentenced to serve 17 years in prison. The two other defendants were considered not guilty and were set free.
According to the demonstrators’ prosecutor, Antonio Molina, the Caracas Metropolitan Police acted as "the armed wing of the opposition” on April 11th 2002, by directly shooting at demonstrators. This provoked a response from the government forces, many of whom were not wearing uniforms. This would provide the images that the opposition channels needed to incriminate the President. They edited pictures of wounded civilians, together with the footage of loyal forces to President Chávez returning fire to the snipers of the Caracas Metropolitan Police. The forces loyal to President Chávez were actually attempting to defend the civilians under attack. But TV-channels made it seem as if the President’s supporters were the ones attacking the civilians. Venezuelan courts have just recently begun to convict the material perpetrators of these acts.

Prosecutor Molina said recently in an interview with Noticias24 that there are indications that the intellectual authors of the coup include the newspaper El Nacional, the TV-news network Globovisión and Channel 4. He thinks that Globovisión is yet to explain the Venezuelan society why the TV-channel concealed footage from Puente Llaguno and Baralt Avenue, which could have been used as proof to incriminate the material perpetrators of the A-11 events. There were nineteen deaths and more than a hundred injuries related to these confrontations.
The verdict of 2009 followed a pardon issued by president Chávez in 2007 to 60 people who signed the Carmona-decree. This decree had ordered the illegal dissolution of President Chávez’s government, on April 12th 2002, as a result of the incidents of the preceding day. This pardon came three years after prosecutor Danilo Anderson was murdered, in November 2004.

Anderson was responsible for processing 400 people who allegedly participated in the coup attempt against President Chávez. A Supreme Court Ruling in March 2005 made it possible for high-ranking Venezuelan officials to stand trial for their role in the April 2002 events. Three former police officers were convicted in 2005 for conducting Anderson’s murder.

It has also been proven that President Chávez never resigned voluntarily in April 2002. He was rather held illegally and was also life threatened by high ranking-officials. Evidence of this are a fax to the then Attorney General Isaias Rodríguez, communication with his daughter and phone calls to Cuban television, which the President managed to make while he was held captive.
Zuloaga's comments and Venezuelan lawNot surprisingly, many Venezuelans know that Zuloaga’s comments are not supported by the existing evidence. Thus, they feel that these comments constitute a baseless attack to the President. This is actually the argument used by the Attorney General Luisa Ortega when she decided to arrest Zuloaga before he attempted to leave the country. It was not that Zuloaga “was critical of the president”, as Globovisión and countless other networks (who are very often critical of the president) have reported, but rather that he made a false public remark about the President, accusing him of being a murderer and indirectly invited to attempt a better coup against him in the future. For this, he was accused on the basis of article 147 and 296 of the Venezuelan Penal Code. He was arrested, because authorities feared that he would leave the country.

Most reports also forget to mention that what has happened in Venezuela is not a result of the President’s sudden whims. Actually, things are often presented as if President Chávez has all of a sudden arbitrarily decided to suppress critical journalists in the country. The fact is that the actions of the police and the Attorney General respond to an application of specific articles in the Venezuelan Penal Code. Reforms to these criminal laws were passed by the National Legislative Commission and National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in March 2000 and April 2005, respectively. The reforms were made through formal democratic processes. This was even before the rightist parties decided to boycott the parliamentary elections of December 2005. Therefore, they still had considerable representation in the Venezuelan National Assembly. The opposition in this assembly was mostly represented by some parties in the “Bloque por El Cambio” (Alliance for Change) and “Bloque por la Autonomía Parlamentaria” (Alliance for Parliamentary Autonomy).

However, despite this, articles 147, 296 and Title III, Chapter VIII, of the Venezuelan Criminal Laws (articles 222 – 228) of 2005 might have been influenced by fears of a generalized environment of conspiracy against the President. These fears were not groundless. This is more evident if we take in consideration the coup attempt of 2002 and among other things, the rightist election boycott of December 2005. Additionally, it has been repeatedly pointed out that rightist media channels played a critical role in these sabotage attempts. There have also been yet-to-be-proven indications of cooperation in the Americas to perform similar sabotage actions against leftist governments in Haiti, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala, during the past years. A probable corroboration of these fears was the successful coup d’état in Honduras, June 28th 2009. A legal conflict: Liberty or libertinage?Regardless of this context, there is every reason to be critical of the theoretical existence of the defamation laws gathered in articles 147, 296 and Title III, Chapter VIII, of the Venezuelan Penal Code, entitled: “About offenses and other crimes against people that are invested with public authority”. Mainly because these laws can be misused in practice, by allowing political leaders to groundlessly curtail the freedom of speech of political opponents. However, this does not mean that there cannot also be reasonable arguments for the existence of such questionable laws and their application in Venezuela. This might prove to be discouraging for the champions of a black and white world. But sometimes there are more nuances. Things are not that simple. In certain cases, there is not necessarily a contradiction between defamation laws and freedom of speech, even in otherwise undemocratic conditions. A remarkable historical example is the Zenger trial in the colony of New York in 1935. John Peter Zenger was accused of slander on the charge of publishing “seditious libels” against William Cosby, the Governor of the colony. Even though the jury had been carefully selected by Governor Cosby, the verdict was “not guilty”. The jurors considered that although Zenger’s articles had been insulting, all statements were based on fact. For some, this trial set precedent and established factual argumentation as the basis of the American democracy.

Further, it showed that freedom of speech and defamation laws can coexist in an acceptable manner, just as long as the Judicial operates on the basis of provable evidence. This coexistence can serve to assert liberty instead of libertinage.

Such a historic case highlights why high quality critical journalism cannot just focus on one of the problematic aspects of a legal conflict. It should take in consideration as many aspects as possible, as well as the context in which the conflict occurs. It is not enough to focus on just one side of the coin of the issue of freedom of speech, forgetting that this liberty is often limited (formally or informally) by conventions that attempt to prevent injuries, or the violation of the integrity of other individuals and institutions. This is even more important when we consider that in exceptional occasions, the people with freedom to express themselves amass large amounts of power and control mass media. Therefore, they have a greater responsibility to use their freedom in a constructive manner. Just as well, it is not much useful to be critical of the application of laws in Venezuela using the same political framework employed to analyze the application of law in the United States or Western Europe.

Not just in VenezuelaEven so, it is important to remember that these laws are by no means a Venezuelan phenomenon, to say the least; they are not the result of Chávez’s fancy. The crime that Venezuelans call vilipendio (contempt) of public authorities has historically been considered an offense against the law in many countries, and not just when directed to public authorities.

For example, in Argentina, similar legislation is specified in articles 109 - 111 and 209 of the Argentinean Penal Code. In Spain it is regulated by articles 205 – 216 of the Penal Code. There is another related article: numeral 3 of article 490, which specifies punishments for contempt of the King or his family. In France, similar legislation is known under the headings of diffamation, injure and outrage. Articles 30 and 31 of the law of July 29th 1881 (entry under Diffamation) contemplate the defamation of a public body or agent. In Italy, it has been specified in articles 341 to 345 of the Codice Penale (Oltraggio a un pubblico ufficiale, Oltraggio a un Corpo politico, amministrativo o giudiziario, Oltraggio a un magistrato in udienza, Oltraggio a un pubblico impiegato and Offesa all'Autorita' mediante danneggiamento di affissioni).

There are similar legal concepts in use in the United States. For example, the notions of “contempt of courts and/or congress” are theoretically related to the notion of vilipendio of public officials in Venezuela. Many states also have what is known as “libel or slander law” (defamation law), although there is indeed no federal defamation law. It is reasonable to think that this has to do with a possible contradiction between these laws and the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court rulings on cases of libel and slander have not relied on the First Amendment consistently. However, in the Sullivan vs. New York Times Co. ruling of 1964, the Supreme Court established that public officials/individuals cannot sue for slander, unless it is on the basis of “actual malice”. This is defined as knowledge that the published/uttered information was false. (Read more on this issue in an article by legal advisor Steven Pressman, published online by the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Germany here)

There are other countries in Europe that also have similar legislation regarding defamation. For example, in Belgium it is found in articles 443 to 453 of the Criminal Code (TITRE VIII. Chapitre V Des atteintes portes a l’honneur ou la consideration des personnes) . In Denmark, similar legislation is found in Chapter 27 of the Penal Law, more clearly in § 267 (Kapitel 27, Freds- og ærekrænkelser). Danish criminal laws include a prohibition to insult the royal authorities in § 115. In Finland, it is found in the Penal Code, Chapter 24 (entitled ‘Offences against privacy, public peace and personal reputation’). Actually, in Germany, it seems like these sorts of crimes are on the rise, according to the Bundeskriminalamt, Police Crime Statistics of 2006 - 2008. In 2005, the recorded cases of insults, malicious gossip and defamation with false statements totaled 179 721. This number grew to 187 527 in 2006, 193 092 in 2007 and 193 617 in 2008.

As in article 147 of the Venezuelan Penal Code, Germany considers disparagement of the Federal President (§90 in the Strafgesetzbuch or Criminal Code) as a crime, as well as other sorts of defamation. These are specified in Criminal Laws: §90a and b, which criminalize the disparagement of the organs of the State, its Symbols, the Constitution and the Constitutional organs; §185, which forbids insults; §186, which forbids malicious gossip; §187, which criminalizes defamation with false statements; §188, which penalizes malicious gossip and political defamation against persons in the political life; §189, which criminalizes the disparagement of the memory deceased person; §192, which forbids insults, despite the existence of true statements in them; §193, which specifies that even critical judgments in the pursuit of legitimate interests will be punished if they result in insults, depending on the form of utterance; §194, which regulates the criminal prosecution under these articles, and §199, which specifies what sort of mutual insult is allowed to be left unpunished.

In Norway, the Penal Law specifies in Chapter 23 Æreskrenkelser § 246 - 254 that defamation is a crime that can be punished with fines or incarceration for up to three years, in certain cases. According to § 135 of the same Penal Law, people that put the general peace in danger by deriding or inciting hatred towards the Constitution or by provoking any part of the public against another, will be punished with fines or with detention or incarceration of up to one year. Article § 101 specifies that mobilizing to violent actions against the King is punishable with incarceration for at least two years and up to twenty one years. Insulting the King is punishable with up to five years in jail.

"Respect for the rights of others is peace"The list of similar legislation in other countries can of course be longer. It should also be noted that the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:
“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” (Article 17).

This same covenant establishes in article 19 that:
“1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals”.

The important questionsWhat is so special then about Venezuelan laws and their application in the Zuloaga arrest? Why are these laws so relevant in Venezuela, while they remain unreported in many other countries that also have them? Most of the media reports can tell us little to answer these very important questions. It is however interesting to see how much relative and partial attention this temporary legal arrest of a news network owner has received. Comparably, the "radical increase in violence against journalists in Honduras" has been less prominent. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in 1992, two journalists were murdered in Honduras. There were no more journalists murdered in the country, until one reported case in 2003. This number grew to two journalists killed during 2009 and five during January - March, 2010. Actually, all five of them, killed in the month of March. Perhaps looking into this very fact is a step forward into achieving a better understanding of what might be at stake in Venezuela.
Alberto Valiente Thoresen

fredag 26. mars 2010

The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help me NRK!

I går når jeg tittet på NRK Tekst-TV snublet jeg over denne perlen:

CHÁVEZ FENGSLET REGIMEKRITIKER
Eieren av den eneste regjeringskritiske TV-stasjonen i Venezuela, Guillermo Zuloaga ble i kveld arrestert, i følge nyhetsbyrået AP.

President Hugo Chávez har stengt en rekke uavhengig radio og TV-stasjoner av politiske grunner, og arrestasjonen blir tolket som et forsøk på å kneble opposisjonen i landet ytterligere.

Chávez' regime forbyr borgerne å ytre noe som etter regjeringens oppfatning kan "true fred og stabilitet".
NRK Tekst-TV 25.03.2010

En rask gjennomgang av teksten avslører hvilket makkverk av usannheter den er:

1) Chávez har ikke fengslet noen som helst: Guillermo Zuloaga ble arrestert når han prøvde å reise fra Venezuela etter at en siktelse hadde blitt tatt ut av statsadvokaten for ærekrenkelse og spredning av falske informasjon. Han ble løslatt på kausjon kort tid etter.

2) Guillermo Zuloaga sin TV-kanal, Globovisión, er ikke den eneste regjeringskritiske TV-stasjonen. Det er tre landsdekkende regjeringskritiske TV-kanaler og flere som sender lokalt og på kabel.

3) President Chávez har ikke stengt en eneste radio eller TV-stasjon. RCTV fikk ikke fornyet sin konsesjon for sending på bakkenettet på grunn av grov brud på kringkastingsreglementet, inkludert deltagelse i statskupp (den sender fremdeles på kabel og via konsesjoner på andre lokalkanaler). Flere radiostasjoner, både regjeringskritiske og ikke regjeringskritiske ble stoppet av kringkastingsetaten fordi de hadde ikke sendingslisenser.

4) Dette kan vanskelig tolkes som ”forsøk på ytterligere knebling av opposisjon” når landets opposisjon fritt yter sine meninger i alle media. Nylig har en av landets journalistforeninger konstatert at Venezuela har aldri før hatt en så bra situasjon for pressefrihet.

5) Det forbys ikke borgerne å ytre meninger som etter regjeringens oppfatning kan "true fred og stabilitet". Venezuela er en rettsstat og det er et klart definert lovverket (lignende dette i USA og flere andre land) som definere ærekrenkelse og spredning av falske informasjon som
har hensikt å desstabilisere og skape sosial uro.


At NRK klarer å gjengi så mange sammenhengende usannheter i en kort Tekst-TV melding burde premieres! Og vi vil oppfordre folk til å klage NRK inn til PFU.

Men de er ikke alene. University of the West of England nylig ga ut en rapport om BBC sin dekning av Venezuela under Hugo Chávez som viser en fullstendig mangel for ”upartiskhet, sannhet og nøyaktighet”.

Her er udrag fra granskningsrapport:

Researchers at the University of the West of England, UK, have exposed ongoing and systematic bias in the BBC’s news reporting on Venezuela. Dr Lee Salter and Dr Dave Weltman analysed ten years of BBC reports on Venezuela since the first election of Hugo Chavez to the presidency in an ongoing research project, and their findings so far show that the BBC’s reporting falls short of its legal commitment to impartiality, truth and accuracy.

The researchers looked at 304 BBC reports published between 1998 and 2008 and found that only 3 of those articles mentioned any of the positive policies introduced by the Chavez administration. The BBC has failed to report adequately on any of the democratic initiatives, human rights legislation, food programmes, healthcare initiatives, or poverty reduction programmes. Mission Robinson, the greatest literacy programme in human history received only a passing mention.

Hele teksten fines her:
http://www.handsoffvenezuela.org/a_decade_of_propaganda_bbc_reporting_venezuela.htm

Dave Watson

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised


La Organización Circulos Bolivarianos de Oslo, Noruega
Le invitan;

A la presentación de la pelicula "La Revolución no será Transmitida".

We have the pleasure to invite you to the presentation of the film; The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.
Date: 13-04-10 Time: from 18:oo hrs Place: Samisk Hus Address: Akersgata 34, Oslo
Lugar de la actividad: Dia 13 de abril a las 6 de la tarde, en el local "Samisk Hus en Akersgata 34, Oslo"

Norske versjon
Den demokratisk valgte presidenten i Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, ble forsøkt styrtet av høyresiden i landet ved hjelp av grov manipulering fra de privateide tv-kanalene. Det ble påstått at 11 mennesker ble drept i sammenstøt mellom Chávez' tilhengere og motstandere, og tv-stasjoner verden over slukte rått at Chávez hadde beordret drapene, slik det fremkom i de privateide kanalene. Det ble også hevdet at dette var den direkte årsaken til statskuppet.

Descripción en Castellano
De intentar ser un documento sobre la revolución y el proceso social en marcha en Venezuela, el material rodado por Kim Bartley y Donnacha 0'Briain se convirtió en un reportaje sobre un golpe de estado más en Latinoamérica (se cuentan 283 golpes desde 1929 hasta 2001) que duró 47 horas. Pero lo excepcional de la cinta, con la capacidad fílmica de lo urgente, de un periodismo cívico que utiliza los medios para denunciar lo injusto, es que las cineastas tuvieron acceso a las reuniones del gabinete, filmaron el golpe, encararon el ultimátum de bombardeo; una vez dado el golpe filmaron al gobierno golpista, presencian la toma del palacio por parte de la tropa de elite y el momento en que se comunica a los golpistas que son prisioneros: lograron una mirada desde el interior del golpe, antes, durante y después del golpe. Filmado con la visceralidad del que vive los acontecimientos junto a los protagonistas y posee un medio de expresión para la denuncia y la información con la pasión, el miedo y la valentía que rasgan la retina de la cámara, el film es un ejercicio que denuncia las malévolas capacidades manipuladoras de los medios privados y un febril ejercicio de cómo se conspira contra un gobierno democráticamente elegido..

English Description.
"The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" is a film about Hugo Chavez, elected president of Venezuela in 1998, and the U.S. supported coup that briefly took him from power. He is beloved by his nation's working class and a tough-as-nails, quixotic opponent to the power structure that would see him deposed. Two independent filmmakers were inside the presidential palace on April 11, 2002, when he was forcibly removed from office. They were also present 48 hours later when, remarkably, he returned to power amid cheering aides. Their film records what was probably history's shortest-lived coup d'?tat. It's about political muscle and an extraordinary portrait of the man The Wall Street Journal credits with making Venezuela "Washington?s biggest Latin American headache after Cuba.

Please confirm. Favor confirmar asistencia.Lugar de la actividad: Dia 13 de abril a las 6 de la tarde, en el local "Samisk Hus en Akersgata 34, Oslo"

Dikt i anledning 30 års dag for drapet på erkebiskop Oscar Romero



El Salvador

Jeg er indianerne som slåss
mot conquistadoren Pedro Alvarado

Jeg er de landløse landarbeiderne
Jeg er de undertrykte på landsbygda

Jeg er Farabundo Marti
Jeg er de 30 000 massakrerte
bøndene ved Izalco

Jeg er de som lider
under tyrannen Martinez

Jeg er dødsskvadronenes
ofre under borgerkrigen

Jeg er de myrdede jesuittprestene
Jeg er de myrdede FMLN-lederne

Jeg er folket
Og en dag skal jeg reise meg
som en mektig flodbølge
for å ta tilbake det livet
andre stjal fra meg

God påske!
Hilsen Åsmund
Medlem av Nettverk for Venezuela

søndag 14. mars 2010

Endringsprosessane si framtid i Latin-Amerika

Onsdag 17. mars blir det debattmøte: ”Endringsprosessane si framtid i Latin-Amerika: Sosialisme for det 21. århundre og dei imperialistiske motkreftene.”
med Med Helen Bank, spesialrådgjevar i For velferdsstaten og Even Sandvik Underlid, master i Spansk og Latinamerika-kunnskap og skribent.
Sted: Speilsalen, Akademiske Kvarter, Olav Kyresgt. Bergen. Tid: Kl.19.00

Store endringsprosessar utviklar seg i Latin-Amerika med folkeleg deltaking. Venezuela, Bolivia, Equador er i front i desse prosessane, kalla sosialisme for det 21. århundre. Men kontraoffensiven mot endringsprosessane i Latin-Amerika er i full gong. USA, dei store internasjonale mediaselskapa og høgresida i landa vil prøve å isolera og rulle attende desse progressive forsøka på alternativer til den globale nyliberalismen. Kva kjenneteiknar motkreftene og korleis kan dei stoppast?
Arrangement er et samarbeid mellom LAG og Attac

mandag 1. mars 2010

The Revolution will not be Televised


Åpent møte

Vi viser dokumentarfilmen

”The Revolution will not be Televised”

(Español/English)



kl.19.00 mandag 1. mars
Seminarrom/Auditorium F (rom 212 andre etasje) på Sydneshaugenskole (gratis inngang)



Den demokratisk valgte presidenten i Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, ble forsøkt styrtet av høyresiden i landet ved hjelp av grov manipulering fra de privateide tv-kanalene. Det ble påstått at 11 mennesker ble drept i sammenstøt mellom Chávez' tilhengere og motstandere, og tv-stasjoner verden over slukte rått at Chávez hadde beordret drapene, slik det fremkom i de privateide kanalene. Det ble også hevdet at dette var den direkte årsaken til statskuppet.



Det irske tv-teamet som fulgte de dramatiske dagene i april 2002 var på rett plass til rett tid. De fulgte presidenten i månedene før og dagene under kuppet, og vi blir i filmen førstehånds vitner til presidentens bevegelser og de beslutningene han tar. Filmen dekker også kuppmakerne og deres strategier. Dessuten får vi et visst innblikk i hva USAs utenriksminister Colin Powell foretar seg. Men først og fremst viser filmen på en forbilledlig måte hvordan levende bilder og klippeteknikker kan benyttes for å skape et falskt bilde av det som faktisk skjer, og formidle dette til en hel verden på kort tid.